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Recent Developments 
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT FOUND 
TO BE A FORM OF SEX 
DISCRIMINATION UNDER 1964 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 106 
S.Ct. 2399 (1986), the United States Su-
preme Court held that a claim of "hostile 
environment" sexual harassment is a form 
of sex discrimination actionable under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
The Court stated that even though em-
ployers are not always automatically liable 
for sexual harassment by their supervisors, 
the employer may be held liable under 
Title VII, even witho~t notice of the ha-
rassment. 
Michelle Vinson had been an employee 
of Meritor Savings Bank from 1974 to 
1978. Sydney Taylor, a vice-president and 
branch manager of the bank, hired her and 
supervised her throughout her years of 
employment. She advanced, based on 
merit alone, from teller-trainee to assistant 
branch manager. In September 1978 Vin-
son took an indefinite sick leave until No-
vember 1,1978, when she was discharged 
for excessive use of that leave. 
After her discharge, Vinson brought this 
action against her former employer, assert-
ing that Taylor had constantly subjected 
her to sexual harassment during her em-
ployment at the bank, thereby violating 
Title VII. She claimed that although she 
had voluntarily engaged in sexual relations 
with Taylor, she did so because of fear of 
losing her job. Taylor and the bank each 
denied the charges. Furthermore, the bank 
said that if the actions complained of had 
occurred, they had not been done with its 
approval. 
The United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia found that a sexual 
harassment claim did not exist unless there 
was an economic effect on the employee, a 
tangible economic loss. Justice Rehnquist 
delivered the Court's opinion and rejected 
that reasoning, as had the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia. Rehnquist 
noted that violation of Title VII may be 
based on one of two types of sexual harass-
ment. Either the harassment may have an 
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economic effect in that it involves the "con-
ditioning of concrete employment benefits 
on sexual favors," or it may have the effect 
of creating a "hostile or offensive working 
environment," although not affecting eco-
nomic benefits. Id. at 2403. 
Sexual harassment allegations, in this 
case, were sufficient to state a claim for 
"hostile environment" sexual harassment, 
according to the Court. Specifically, ViI)--
son's allegations that Taylor made repeated 
demands for sexual favors, followed her 
into the ladies' room when she went there 
alone, exposed himself to her, forcibly 
raped her, and fondled her in front of others 
were actions severe enough to create an 
abusive work environment and a cause of 
action for "hostile environment" sexual 
harassment. 
In addressing the sexual harassment 
claim, the Court relied on two significant 
cases, one regarding discriminatory work 
environment, Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 
234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 
957 (1972), and the other applying dis-
crimination in the work environment to 
discrimination based on sex, Henson v. 
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). 
Courts first recognized discriminatory 
work environment as a cause of action in 
Rogers. In that case, involving a Hispanic 
plaintiff alleging discrimination, the court 
explained that under Title VII an em-
ployee's protections extended beyond the 
economic aspect of employment. Follow-
ing Rogers, courts have applied this prin-
ciple to harassment based on race, religion, 
and national origin. Meritor Savings Bank 
v. Vinson, 106 S.Ct. at 2405. In the case 
before it, the Supreme Court reasoned that 
similarly a "hostile environment based on 
discriminatory sexual harassment should 
... be likewise prohibited" (emphasis in 
original). Id. 
In Henson, the Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit recognized that "[s]exual 
harassment which creates a hostile or of-
fensive environment for members of one 
sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sex-
ual equality at the workplace that racial 
harassment is to racial equality." Id. at 
2046. 
Yet both the Rogers and Henson cases 
recognized that not all workplace conduct 
which is classified as "harassment" affects 
the aspects of employment required within 
the meaning of Title VII. For sexual ha-
rassment to be actionable, the Court relied 
on the Henson explanation that it must be 
"sufficiently severe or pervasive so that the 
conditions of employment are altered and 
an abusive working environment is cre-
ated." Id. In this case, however, the court 
concluded that the allegations were suffi-
cient to create a claim for "hostile environ-
ment" sexual harassment. 
The Supreme Court also rejected the 
District Court's theory that because the 
sex-related conduct was "voluntary," i.e., 
complainant was not forced to participate 
against her will, it was not sexual harass-
ment. Justice Rehnquist said that "[t]he 
correct inquiry is whether respondent by 
her conduct indicated that the alleged sex-
ual advances were unwelcome, not whether 
the actual participation in sexual inter-
course was voluntary." Id. This is so be-
cause the sex-related conduct could be 
"voluntary" in that the party was not forced 
to participate against her will. Therefore, 
the critical point is that the sexual ad-
vances were ''unwelcome.'' Id. 
In a final point regarding the "hostile en-
vironment" claim, the Court held that evi-
dence of the claimant's sexually provoca-
tive speech or dress is not inadmissible per 
se. In fact, in this case it would be relevant 
because the existence of sexual harassment 
must be determined in view of the totality 
of the circumstances and in light of the 
record as a whole. Therefore, the nature of 
the sexual advances and the context within 
which they occurred would be relevant. 
When addressing the issue of employer 
liability, the Court declined to issue a de-
finitive ruling regarding the matter. The 
Court applied agency principles and con-
sidered Congressional intent when it held 
that employers are not always automatically 
liable for sexual harassment by their em-
ployees. Nor does absence of notice to an 
employer of the supervisor's sexual harass-
ment protect the employer from liability. 
In this case, however, the Court found the 
bank liable. First, the existence of a bank 
policy against discrimination was not suf-
ficient to protect the bank because the 
policy did not address sexual harassment. 
The policy therefore failed to notify em-
ployees of the employer's interest in avoid-
ing that form of discrimination. Second, 
the mere existence of a grievance procedure 
within the bank was insufficient to protect 
the bank against liability because the pro-
cedure required an employee to complain 
to her supervisor first. In this case, the 
employee would have had to complain to 
the alleged perpetrator, which she under-
standably failed to do. The Court left the 
door open regarding the rulings on em-
ployer's liability in the future. It even sug-
gested that if the employer's "procedures 
were better calculated to encourage victims 
of harassment to come forward" the em-
ployer may be able to avoid liability. ld. 
at 2409. 
Justice Marshall delivered the concur-
ring opinion, joined by Justices Brennan, 
Blackmun, and Stevens. They agreed that 
workplace sexual harassment is illegal and 
violates Title VII. As regards employer 
liability, however, the justices concluded 
that "sexual harassment by a supervisor of 
an employee under his supervision, lead-
ing to a discriminatory work environment, 
should be imputed to the employer for 
Title VII purposes, regardless of whether 
the employee gave 'notice' of the offense." 
ld. at 2411. 
Based on the Court's holding there may 
be problems in the future concerning proof 
of whether conduct was "unwelcome" or 
"voluntary." Also, the issue of employer 
liability in sexual harassment cases has 
been left open, although the Court has 
indicated that future cases should apply 
agency principles. 
-Libby C. Reamer 
Bethel School District No. 403 v. 
Fraser: FIRST AMENDMENT DOES 
NOT PREVENT SCHOOL DISTRICT 
FROM DISCIPLINING STUDENT 
FOR GIVING OFFENSIVELY LEWD 
AND INDECENT SPEECH 
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 
(1969), the Supreme Court of the United 
States acknowledged that students do not 
"shed their constitutional rights to free-
dom of speech or expression at the school-
house gate." ld. at 506. Recently, however, 
the Court held that a school district acted 
entirely within its permissible authority in 
imposing sanctions upon a high school 
student in response to the student's offen-
sively lewd and indecent speech given at a 
school assembly. The Court held that such 
speech was not protected by the first amend-
ment. Bethel School District No. 403 v. 
Fraser, 106 S.Ct. 3159 (1986). 
Matthew Fraser was a high school stu-
dent in Bethel, Washington. At a school 
assembly attended by about 600 students, 
many of whom were 14 years of age, Fraser 
delivered a speech in support of a candi-
date for student government office. The 
speech referred to the candidate in terms 
of explicit sexual metaphors, employing 
such phrases as "he's firm in his pants ... 
his character is firm," "a man who takes his 
point and pounds it in," and "a man who 
will go to the very end - even the climax, 
for each and every one of you." ld. at 3167. 
Students at the assembly hooted and yelled 
during the speech, mimicking the sexual ac-
tivities alluded to in the speech, while 
others appeared to be shocked and embar-
rassed. Prior to Fraser's delivery of the 
speech, two of his teachers with whom he 
had discussed the contents of his speech 
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in advance, advised him that it was inap-
propriate and should not be given. 
The day after he delivered the speech, 
Fraser was asked to report to the assistant 
principal's office. At the meeting, Fraser 
was given notice that he was being charged 
with violating the school's disruptive con-
duct rule, which prohibited conduct that 
substantially interfered with the educa-
tional process, including the use of ob-
scene, profane language or gestures. After 
being given an opportunity to explain his 
conduct, in which he admitted that he de-
libenitely used sexual innuendos in the 
speech, Fraser was suspended for three 
days. In addition, he was informed that his 
name would be removed from a list of can-
didates on a ballot for graduation speakers. 
Fraser initiated a grievance of the disci-
plinary action through the school dis-
trict's grievance procedures. The hearing 
officer affirmed the decision but Fraser 
was allowed to return to school after serv-
ing only two days of his suspension. Fraser, 
joined by his father as guardian ad litem, 
then filed a civil rights action in federal 
district court, seeking injunctive relief 
and monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. The district court, holding that 
the sanctions violated the student's rights 
under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments, awarded Fraser monetary damages 
and enjoined the school district from pre-
venting him from speaking at graduation. 
Fraser was elected graduation speaker and 
spoke at the commencement ceremonies. 
The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 
court judgment, rejecting the argument 
that the nomination speech had a disrup-
tive effect on the educational process. The 
court also rejected the argument that the 
school district had an interest in protecting 
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